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And you may ask yourself, “Well...How did I get here?” -  Talking Heads
*
Current discourse concerning the proper role of courts in constitutional cases essentially amounts 
to a continuum of (sometimes buried) theoretical disputes. The nature of the dispute rests on the 
manner in which one sets up the issue. One can cast the matter as a question of legal philosophy; 
that is, as a discussion which aims to decide whether one can characterize legislation, running 
contrary to certain moral values, as law at all, such that it deserves deference by adjudicative 
bodies. One can frame the question as one of political philosophy by asking what political 
morality requires of legal institutions; i.e., whether a just society can permit unelected 
institutions to strike down democratically created legislation. Lastly (though this is by no means 
an exhaustive list), one may understand this issue as one of constitutional theory -  as a debate 
over what a particular constitutional regime requires of courts.
By talking about ‘judicial activism’ in the first place, one raises a host of theoretical 
concerns. Yet, oddly, one encounters little scholarly activity concerning how courts themselves 
should deal with theoretical arguments used in support of constitutional claims. A wide selection 
of law review articles and monographs present some sort of working theory that their respective 
authors implicitly claim the courts should use to settle constitutional litigation. They do not, 
however, explicitly say what makes (or should make) one theory more or less attractive to a 
court when competing theories are brought before it. In cases where that happens, the court can 
choose to ‘defer’ to one party’s theory of the Constitution -  for instance, that offered by the 
Crown in support of a section 1 justification -  or it can choose to disregard that theory as
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untenable. In a sense, this is a meta-decision in the judicial activism debate. Depending on the 
meta-theory the Supreme Court adopts, it will apply a different political/legal/constitutional 
theory of deference (which in turn will affect its decision to uphold or strike down a given piece 
of legislation).
This paper seeks to accomplish two tasks. First, it discusses briefly why the use of theory 
in litigation has recently become an interesting issue. Second, it explains why the Court cannot 
adopt a wholly deferential approach to theories advanced in the course of constitutional 
litigation; and, in particular, cannot accept positivist theories of Canadian law. Its point of 
departure, with respect to the second issue, will be the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Sauvé 
v. Canada}
*
In Campbell, a majority of the Supreme Court suggested that the Canadian Constitution contains 
“underlying, unwritten, and organizing principles”;2 that the formal provisions of the 
Constitution reflect an overarching “political theory” -  a theory of the good society.3 By 
entrenching the rules contained in the Constitution, the ‘framers’ gave legal effect not only to 
those rules, but to the principles that animated them. The Constitution, then, can have something 
to say on legal questions though it features no written provision formally addressing them. 
Provided that one can find a plausible theory to explain the Constitution’s written components, 
one can infer from that theory an array of implied constitutional rights and jurisdictional 
limitations. As Lamer C.J. states:
1 Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officerj, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 218 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Sauvé]
2 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court o f Prince Edward Island; Reference re Independence 
and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. 
Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister o f Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 107
. 95, citing Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 306 (per Rand J ).
[Campbell]. 
Ibid. at para
[The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867] recognizes and 
affirms the basic principles which are the very source of the 
substantive provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. As I have 
said above, those provisions merely elaborate those organizing 
principles in the institutional apparatus they create or contemplate.
As such, the preamble is not only a key to construing the express 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also invites the use of 
those organizing principles to fill out gaps in the express terms of 
the constitutional scheme. It is the means by which the underlying 
logic of the Act can be given the force of law.4
Before Campbell, the Court had occasionally relied on this idea of an unwritten Constitution to 
strike down provincial legislation it found incompatible with an intention to create a federal 
state.5 Campbell, however, was a watershed. A majority of the Court not only declared certain 
practices unconstitutional, it used a theoretical analysis of constitutional democracy to infer that 
the provinces had a positive obligation to take certain steps to ensure the independence of 
provincial court judges.6 The Court, in doing so, made a bold statement about the extent to which
4 Campbell, ibid. See also Ivan Rand, “The Role o f an Independent Judiciary In Preserving Freedom” (1951) 9 
U.T.L.J. 1 at 2 (“[Underlying all systems of social law are shadowy provisional postulates o f a transcendental 
nature. Our lives are said to be rounded with a sleep and a forgetting, but they are couched also in assumptions”).
5 For example, in Winner v. SMT (Eastern) Ltd., [1951] S.C.R. 887 at 919, Rand J. held that, as citizens in a federal 
state, Canadians had an “inherent and constitutive” right to move from one province to another; and that provinces 
could not enact legislation that would effectively deprive citizens o f access (for instance, by denying certain kinds o f  
employment to particular classes o f people). See also Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v. Bryden, 
[1899] A.C. 580; Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, the Court found that -  owing to the framers’ implied intention to create a federal state -  
provinces ordinarily have a constitutional obligation to enforce court judgments made in other provinces. See also 
Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 (per LeBel J., dissenting); Hunt v. T & N PLC, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289. For an 
interesting discussion, see Rebecca Johnson & Thomas Kuttner, “Treading on Dicey Ground: Citizenship and the 
politics o f the rule o f law” in Carl Stychin & Didi Herman, eds., Law and Sexuality: The Global Arena 
(Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 2001); Rebecca Johnson, “Justice La Forest, Sexual Orientation and 
Citizenship” in Rebecca Johnson & John P. McEvoy with Thomas Kuttner & Wade MacLauchlan, eds., Gerard V. 
La Forest at The Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1997 (Supreme Court o f Canada Historical Society, 2000).
6 Although I cite Campbell, supra note 2, for the proposition that theory matters, I do not necessarily endorse the 
result in Campbell. Specifically, while I agree with Lamer C.J.’s view that, accepting the existence o f unwritten 
principles, judicial independence must be one of them, I do not agree that this means that the government is 
constitutionally required to create independent commissions if  some other equally effective means o f protecting 
judicial independence were devised. The requirement o f a commission, I would submit, is a prophylactic rule -  not a 
constitutional rule. For much the same reason, I have doubts that legislative privilege is actually required as an 
unwritten principle o f  the Constitution; though it protects Parliamentary debate, it may be only one o f several 
possible means of providing such protection. But see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of 
the House), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876.
it would rely on theoretical arguments.7 When the Court again used unwritten principles to 
address an issue no less important than Quebec’s right to secede,8 it might well have seemed that 
theory would come to dominate legal discourse -  or, at least, that the legal community had 
finally come to show a sustained interest in it.9
Having committed itself in principle to philosophical debates in the courtroom, however, 
the Court left open the question of how it should resolve them; i.e., which theories should 
command the respect of judges. If the Constitution is unified by a common design -  by a 
common political theory -  the Supreme Court cannot give every theory of Canadian law equal 
credence. Yet, at the same time, it does not want to simply declare by fiat the ‘correctness’ of a 
single theory, since doing so would have implications too far-reaching and unpredictable.10 Some 
theories warrant greater deference than others, but the Court steps into a minefield if it explicitly 
throws its weight behind one theory in particular. Once it does that, the Court casts aside any 
pretensions it might have as a politically disinterested institution. That may or may not be a bad 
thing -  as much of this paper will argue, one cannot extricate law from moral or political 
considerations. If the Court makes that move, however, it should wait until it can confidently say 
which political theory is best, given the Canadian constitutional landscape as a whole. In the 
meantime, parties may well wonder which theories are worth presenting to the Court and which
7 A little too bold for some: see Jacob Ziegel, “The Supreme Court Radicalizes Judicial Compensation” (1998) 9:2 
Const. Forum 31.
8 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 49 (identifying “federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule o f  law, and respect for minority rights” as “four foundational constitutional 
principles”).
See Sujit Choudry & Robert Howse, “Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference” (2000) 13 Can. 
J. L. & Jur. 143 at 144-5 (remarking that, until the Quebec Secession Reference, there was little academic interest in 
developing a Canadian constitutional theory). For insight as to the indifference or hostility shown to theory, by the 
legal profession, for much o f  the latter’s history, see Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (Stanford University Press, 
1981) at 19; Ivan C. Rand, “Legal Education in Canada” (1954) 32 Can. Bar Rev. 387 at 400-10; Michael Lobban, 
The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at ch. 3; Christopher W. 
Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since 1450 (London: Hambledon, 1998). Just twenty years ago, 
one heard suggestions that law faculties should be divided by a kind o f  academic wall, separating the practitioner- 
educators from the legal theorists, lest one corrupt the other: see Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa: Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council o f Canada, 1983) at 137.
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, “Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided” (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 6; Alexander M. Bickel, 
“Foreword: The Passive Virtues” (1961) 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40.
are dead in the water. On this point, Gonthier J.’s dissenting opinion in Sauvé v. Canada makes 
for interesting reading. There, he remarked:
[T]here is copious expert testimony in the nature of legal and 
political philosophy. I do not think that the Court need necessarily 
defer to this second type of expertise, or take into account the 
"skill" and "reputation" of the experts in weighing this evidence ...
[L]egal theory expert testimony in this context essentially purports 
to justify axiomatic principles. Therefore, these arguments are 
either persuasive or not. In this context, it is appropriate for courts 
to look not only to such theoretical arguments but also beyond, to 
factors such as the extent of public debate on an issue, the practices 
of other liberal democracies and, most especially, to the reasoned 
view of our democratically elected Parliament.11
No doubt Gonthier J. is correct to a point. The intuitions of the Canadian public and Members of 
Parliament, as well as those of people in other democratic countries, surely matter when one 
devises a legal or political theory.12 There is something troubling, however, about the idea that, 
when debating questions of legality, one can find nothing to choose between different legal 
philosophies on their own terms. In a way, it seems radically democratic: anyone can have an 
opinion and everyone’s opinion ‘counts’.13 And, to be fair, just saying that a country is 
democratic, or that it abides by the rule of law, does not settle much. With that broad starting 
point, one can find a great deal of room for reasonable disagreement.14 In that sense, Gonthier J. 
is right to comment:
There is a flaw in an analysis which suggests that because one 
social or political philosophy can be justified, it necessarily means 
that another social or political philosophy is not justified: in other 
words, where two social or political philosophies exist, it is not by
11 Sauvé, supra note 1 at para. 101.
12 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), for the proposition that when 
creating a theory o f justice one should employ a ‘reflective equilibrium’.
13 As Mark Kingwell points out, modem Western culture may tend to make intellectuals o f  everyone: see Practical 
Judgments: Essays in Vulture, Politics, and lnterpretation f (J mversity oYloronto~Press,*2W2j atT5-"V
14 See P.P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States o f America (Clarendon 
Press, 1990) at 4-5; R. M. Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 4 -  Political Equality” (1987-88) 22 U. S. F. L. Rev. 1 
at 2.
approving one that you disprove the other. Differences in social or 
political philosophy, which result in different justifications for 
limitations upon rights, are perhaps inevitable in a pluralist society. 
That having been said, it is only those limitations which are not 
reasonable or demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society which are unconstitutional. Therefore, the most significant 
analysis in this case is the examination of the social or political 
philosophy underpinning the justification advanced by the Crown. 
This is because it will indicate whether the limitation of the right to 
vote is reasonable and is based upon a justification which is 
capable of being demonstrated in a free and democratic society. If 
the choice made by Parliament is such, then it ought to be 
respected. The range of choices made by different legislatures in 
different jurisdictions, which I will review below, supports the 
view that there are many resolutions to the particular issue at bar 
which are reasonable; it demonstrates that there are many possible 
rational balances.15
One has good reason to think that many different theories could plausibly underpin a “free and 
democratic society” and that, in principle, any one of them could justify state action infringing a 
Charter right. One must, however, read section 1 in the context of the entire Constitution,16 a 
body of law designed to create not just any free and democratic society, but one of a very 
particular kind.17 Parliament may devise any number of policies or initiatives consistent with 
democracy broadly understood, but if they do not conform to the uniquely Canadian vision of 
democracy reflected in the Constitution, it cannot implement them. And the Constitution 
contains far more than a bare reference to those values to which the Supreme Court alludes in 
Campbell or the Quebec Secession Reference. Any first-year law student, studying for her mid­
term and final examinations, knows all too well that the Constitution contains hundreds of 
written provisions, each of which offers an insight into that uniquely Canadian conception of 
democracy. When the Crown seeks to justify its conduct under section 1 of the Charter, any 
justificatory theory it provides must conform to that body of law as a whole. That requirement 
substantially narrows the number of possible theories available to the Crown. (One suspects that
15 Sauvé, supra note 1 at para. 97.
16 See Campbell, supra note 2 at para. 107 (“the Constitution is to be read as a unified whole”); Reference re Bill 30, 
An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 at 1206.
17 But see R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 67.
theorists find so daunting the task of crafting a unified Canadian constitutional theory not 
because they have so little with which to work -  philosophers have no fear of fashioning theories 
from whole cloth -  but because they have so much to synthesize.) With that in mind, it may well 
be that, in the vast number of cases, one can disprove one theory by simply giving the nod to 
another; that only a very few number of theories can emerge as viable contenders.
The better part of this paper does not attempt to sort out what specific kind of theory 
would best fit the Canadian constitutional landscape -  in not doing so, it honours a longstanding 
intellectual convention.18 Instead, it attempts to show why a certain kind of theoretical argument
-  namely, the type grounded in the positivist tradition -  cannot succeed as a justification for state 
action in constitutional cases. In making that argument, it traces the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sauvé.
*
In Sauvé, the Supreme Court struck down federal provisions disenfranchising individuals 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years or more for the duration of their respective 
sentences.19 A thin majority of the Court held that the Crown failed to justify, under section 1 of 
the Charter,20 Parliament’s infringement of inmates’ Charter right to vote.21 The government 
enunciated two objectives ostensibly served by the disenfranchisement of prisoners. First, the
18 See Choudry and Howse, supra note 9 at 144-5.
19 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
20 Section 1 o f  the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” See Constitution Act, 1982 
(79), enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11. The Crown bears the burden o f  establishing 
the reasonableness o f a statute limiting a Charter right. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. See also Sauvé, supra 
note 1 at paras. 12-14 (observing that, in the absence o f justification for the limiting o f  a right, section 1 provides no 
protection for the infringing statute), para. 18. The Crown will discharge its burden, under section 1, where it shows 
inter alia that the limiting statute has an objective rationally connected to the limitation o f  the right. In addition, the 
Crown must establish that the limiting statute impairs the right only to the extent necessary to fulfill its objective; 
and that the adverse effects, stemming from the limitation of the right, do not disproportionately outweigh the 
benefits o f fulfilling the objective o f the limiting statute.
21 The Crown conceded that the statutory provisions infringed section 3 o f the Charter. Sauvé, ibid. at para. 6.
provision in question “enhance[s] civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law.”22 Second, 
it serves the denunciatory and deterrent goals of sentencing.23 Of these objectives, the majority’s 
analysis of only the first matters here. The government claimed that “depriving penitentiary 
inmates of the vote sends an ‘educative message’ about the importance of respect for the law”;24 
that disenfranchising serious criminal offenders teaches the public that the rights accompanying 
Canadian citizenship imply obligations to obey the law.
In making that argument, the government relied upon a conception of democracy as a 
simple quid pro quo contractual arrangement;25 i.e., as an agreement among citizens that each 
cede to the others some measure of control over policies affecting her life (in the form of a right 
to vote) in exchange for obedience to the laws created pursuant to that vote. It follows that when 
a citizen commits a serious criminal offense, the community may disenfranchise her. The 
offender’s particular reasons for committing the offense do not matter; by committing the 
offense, the offender relinquishes any entitlement to participate in the electoral process. As the 
dissent said:
Permitting the exercise of the franchise by offenders incarcerated 
for serious offences undermines the rule of law and civic 
responsibility because such persons have demonstrated a great 
disrespect for the community in their committing serious crimes: 
such persons have attacked the stability and order within our 
community. Society therefore may choose to curtail temporarily 
the availability of the vote to serious criminals both to punish those 
criminals and to insist that civic responsibility and respect for the 
rule of law, as goals worthy of pursuit, are prerequisites to 
democratic participation.26
21 Ibid. at para. 21.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. at para. 29.
25 I rely, here, on the dissenting opinion’s analysis o f the government’s argument. See Sauvé, ibid. at para. 115: 
“The social contract is the theoretical basis upon which the exercise o f  rights and participation in the democratic 
process rests.”
Ibid. at para. 116 [emphasis added].
McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority, disagreed that the government’s interest in educating 
the public about the “importance of respect for the law” could have a rational connection to any 
statute limiting the right to vote.27 She took that position in large part because she simply did not 
think that the theory propounded by the Crown -  and adopted arguendo by the dissent -  could 
convince anyone that democratically made laws have moral legitimacy. The majority stated:
The "educative message" that the government purports to send by 
disenfranchising inmates is both anti-democratic and internally 
self-contradictory. Denying a citizen the right to vote denies the 
basis of democratic legitimacy. It says that delegates elected by the 
citizens can then bar those very citizens, or a portion of them, from 
participating in future elections. But if we accept that 
governmental power in a democracy flows from the citizens, it is 
difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to 
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government's 
power flows.28
The dissenting opinion would have deferred to Parliament in its judgment that 
disenfranchisement could educate Canadians about the importance of obeying the law; that the 
theory upon which Parliament relied could reasonably establish a connection between the 
importance of the right to vote in a democratic country and the obligation of its citizens to obey 
laws democratically made. The Court splits on this point because they disagree about whether 
the Crown’s argument really lacks internal coherence. If it does not, the majority has no reason 
to doubt its consistency with Canadian constitutional principles -  at least it offers nothing 
resembling a thorough philosophical analysis of democratic law-making with which it might 
rebuke the Crown’s theory. The dissent’s own analysis has far more depth. One ventures that, by 
the conclusion of his opinion, Gonthier J. has made a compelling case that one can explain 
democratic institutions with reference to nothing more than a bare contractual relationship 
between oneself and one’s community.29 Nonetheless, the majority’s judgment ultimately has 
more persuasive force, not because it presents a fuller, richer theory of democratic law-making,
27 Ibid. at para. 29.
2S Ibid. at para. 32.
29 The dissenting opinion is grounded in a deferential posture, so one cannot say whether some or all o f the 
dissenting judges would claim that legal obligations in Canadian democracy ought to be explained in this way.
but because it reflects a better understanding of what sort of theory cannot hold sway in a 
democratic country.
The difficulty with the Crown’s theory, to which the majority alluded, follows from the 
claim that democratic legitimacy stems from a quid pro quo contractual relationship. That sort of 
explanation, though superficially appealing, does not account for why people should agree to 
‘contract into’ a democratic state in the first place. Assuming that citizens do indeed have an 
obligation to obey the law, the Crown must explain the source of that obligation if it wants to 
‘educate’ them. It cannot say that one must obey the law simply because it is the law; such an 
appeal could not resonate with anyone not already predisposed to obeying the law. Nor can it 
plausibly say that people should obey the law only because, if they do not, they will suffer 
punishment; that argument would have trivial persuasive force in situations where one can see 
little risk of apprehension. Surely, the Crown wants citizens to feel their obligations even when 
they could get away with criminal offenses. Indeed, one would think that an ‘educational’ 
project, such as that impugned in Sauvé, is designed precisely to make it unnecessary for the 
state to watch citizens all the time; to encourage citizens to exercise self-discipline in recognition 
of their obligations as citizens.30 If the Crown wants to say that citizens have an obligation to 
obey the law, it must say that such an obligation is moral; that they should obey the law because 
doing so is right, even if they disagree with the law’s substantive content.31
Any social contract theory upon which the Crown relies must explain why citizens have a 
moral obligation to obey the law. The theory advanced by the Crown does not do that. It merely
30 H.L.A. Hart observed that one cannot make sense o f an obligation created solely by the threat o f force. See H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Lccw, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
31 See Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 8 at para. 33: “In our constitutional tradition, legality and legitimacy 
are linked ” See also ibid at para. 67:
[A] system o f government cannot survive through adherence to the law alone. A 
political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our political culture, that 
requires an interaction between the rule o f law and the democratic principle. The 
system must be capable o f  reflecting the aspirations o f  the people. But there is 
more. Our law's claim to legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, 
many of which are imbedded in our constitutional structure. It would be a grave
describes the circumstances under which one of the parties may cease to enjoy the benefits of the 
social contract -  that is, when she fails to obey a legal rule. On the bare terms of the Crown’s 
theory, the individual citizen may have an obligation to obey the law, but only if she wants to 
remain a party to the contract. At the same time, it provides no moral reason why that citizen 
should or would choose to remain a party. Presumably, people opt into the contractual 
arrangement for some reason, but the Crown never bothers to identify it. If people contract into 
society for entirely non-moral reasons -  for instance, if they do so only because they worry about 
what others will think of them if they do not; or if they do so not because they think it is right to 
join the contract but because it is in their best interests (e.g., financially) to do so32 - one wonders 
why a party should feel obligated by that contract if (to continue the above examples) she no 
longer cares what her law-abiding peers think of her; or if the cost of compliance exceeds the 
cost of disobedience. The Crown cannot explain to the public how it has an obligation to obey 
the law just by explaining that a social contract exists. Since the legitimacy of law ostensibly 
flows from the contract, merely telling people they should obey law because there is a contract 
amounts to saying they should obey law because it is law.
Furthermore, the Crown runs into trouble once its theory raises the prospect that some 
people may not be obligated to comply, because it must then attempt to explain, first, why 
anyone should remain party to the contract if others choose to ‘defect’;33 and, second, where it 
finds the authority to punish defectors who have broken the law. Whether one joins the contract 
for moral or non-moral reasons, she does so with the expectation that others will to some extent 
subordinate their desires to the dictates of legal rules created under the contractual arrangement. 
If others do not meet that expectation -  or if one detects a reasonable prospect that they will not
-  there seems little point in adhering to the agreement; that is, in limiting one’s own freedom to 
act purely out of self-interest while others remain unconstrained. On the other hand, though the
mistake to equate legitimacy with the "sovereign will" or majority rule alone, to 
the exclusion o f other constitutional values.
32 This example assumes that one does not adopt a rational egoist model o f  morality -  a model I find difficult to take 
seriously.
33 I purposely use, here, the language o f  ‘game theory’. For a discussion o f the classic problem, posed by the 
‘prisoners’ dilemma’, see Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) at ch.
12.
state cannot seriously consider the possibility of citizens’ ‘opting out’ of the law, it has trouble 
explaining the basis of its moral authority to punish defectors. It would seem that ultimately the 
Crown’s claim to authority is premised largely (if not exclusively) upon its ability to force 
people to comply -  and not on any claim of moral entitlement.
If one looks at the Crown’s theory in this light, one can see why the Sauvé majority 
rejected it as a sound means of educating citizens about the need to respect the law -  why 
McLachlin C.J. disparaged it as “bad pedagogy”.34 Its problems stem not from any inherent 
implausibility -  one can envision a theory of democracy that grounds legal authority in force 
alone -  or that makes no claim about the moral legitimacy of legal rules created through 
democratic processes. Any such theory, however, would lose its power to persuade people to 
respect, and comply with, legal rules that have a content with which they do not agree. That kind 
of theory could interest only academics; to anyone who wants a theory of law that actually 
presents law as a respectable institution -  for instance, the Crown -  only a conception of law 
bound up with the idea of moral duty will suffice. For precisely this reason, McLachlin C.J. 
rejects the idea that any useful theory of democracy could claim that the state has the power to 
disenfranchise people on the basis of ‘moral worthiness’.35 The state has the authority to create 
new moral obligations -  in the sense that it has authority to create new laws that people have a 
moral obligation to obey -  to the extent that people make the moral choice to opt into (and 
remain a part of) a social contract. The capacity of citizens to make moral choices therefore lies 
at the foundation of any successful justificatory theory of law; it is logically prior to the existence 
of a legitimate law-making process. It follows that the law cannot have legitimate authority to 
declare persons (or classes of persons) unfit to make moral judgments (or ‘correct’ moral
34 Sauvé, supra note 1 at para. 30.
35 Ibid. at para. 37:
the government is making a decision that some people, whatever their abilities, 
are not morally worthy to vote -  that they do not "deserve" to be considered 
members o f the community and hence may be deprived o f  the most basic of 
their constitutional rights. But this is not the lawmakers' decision to make. The 
Charter makes this decision for us by guaranteeing the right o f "every citizen" to 
vote and by expressly placing prisoners under the protective umbrella o f the 
Charter through constitutional limits on punishment. The Charter emphatically 
says that prisoners are protected citizens, and short o f a constitutional 
amendment, lawmakers cannot change this.
judgments), since such a finding effectively removes the labeled class of persons from the sphere 
of people over whom the Crown could have authority of the scope and kind it wants. In so doing, 
the Crown weakens the obligation-creating power of the contract generally. As McLachlin C.J. 
observed:
The right of all citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental 
ability or other distinguishing features, underpins the legitimacy of 
Canadian democracy and Parliament's claim to power. A 
government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of 
citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the 
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its 
claim to representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right 
to convict and punish law-breakers.36
Sauvé stands for the proposition that theory matters -  not just in the classroom, but in the 
courtroom and in the House of Commons. Some theories, however, are simply not eligible for 
consideration inasmuch as they cannot do what theory needs to do to keep legal institutions 
vibrant and authoritative. Positivist theories of law, in particular, are ill suited.37 Positivists claim 
there is no necessary connection between law and morality. They claim that, rather than discern 
the law through reference to moral arguments, one distinguishes legal rules from other kinds of 
rules by looking to their pedigree.38 But that sort of argument has limited appeal to anyone who 
thinks that, although a formal chain of authority is important for the sake of stability, the ‘plain 
fact’ that a legal rule was created according to formal procedures laid down by a body or 
institution charged with creating law does not pre-empt one’s own judgment about the content of 
that rule; and particularly one’s moral judgment about that rule. Indeed, it is hard to say who -  in
36 Ibid. at para. 34.
37 Again, this is not to say that some theories o f law grounded in morality cannot also be ruled out as viable 
contenders. A theory o f law grounded in the tenets o f national socialism, for instance, would seem foredoomed to 
provoke a crisis o f legitimacy.
This claim may be weaker or stronger depending on the kind o f positivism about which one speaks. A ‘hard’ or 
exclusive legal positivist will claim that there is necessarily no connection between law and morality -  that a law 
discernible only through moral argument amounts to no law at all. A ‘soft’ or inclusive legal positivist will argue 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality -  that a legal system may have legal rules 
discoverable through moral argument, but that a legal system need not do so in order to count as a legal system. See, 
for a discussion, Jules L. Coleman, “Negative and Positive Positivism” (1982) 11 J. Legal Stud. 139.
a democratic society, at any rate -  actually does think in the way that positivists suppose.39 When 
Parliament creates new law, Canadian citizens do not think themselves bound to obey it (still less 
to respect it) just because Parliament created it. They think themselves entitled to scrutinize the 
content of that law, to decide for themselves whether or not Parliament has overstepped its 
authority to morally obligate them40 The Supreme Court has recognized that its own authority, 
and that of other courts, does not rest entirely (perhaps even predominantly) upon its formal 
status. Judicial authority depends in large part upon courts providing reasons for their decisions 
and thereby opening up their rulings to public scrutiny.41 In Baker,42 the Court suggests that 
certain executive decisions must be accompanied by reasons. Though the Court qualified this 
duty, it held that reasons would be required in any case “where the decision has important
39 See Ronald Dworkin, “Thirty Years On”, Book Review o f The Practice of Principle: In Defense o f a Pragmatist 
Approach to Legal Theory by Jules L. Coleman (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1655 at 1672 (referring to a hard positivist 
conception o f  authority):
It is a coherent account o f the point o f authority. It presupposes, however, a 
degree o f deference toward legal authority that almost no one shows in modem 
democracies. We do not treat even those laws we regard as perfectly valid and 
legitimate as excluding and replacing the background reasons the framers o f that 
law rightly considered in adopting it. We rather regard those laws as creating 
rights and duties that normally trump those other reasons. The reasons remain, 
and we sometimes need to consult them to decide whether, in particular 
circumstances, they are so extraordinarily powerful or important that the law’s 
trump should not prevail.
See also Scott Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority” (2003) 9 Legal Theory 201; Michael C. 
Plaxton, “The Formalist Conception o f the Rule o f Law and the Marshall Backlash” (2003) 8 Rev. Const. Stud. 66.
40 See Dworkin, ibid.
41 See/?, v. Sheppard' [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 at para. 5: “At the broadest level o f accountability, the giving o f reasoned 
judgments is central to the legitimacy o f  judicial institutions in the eyes o f the public. Decisions on individual cases 
are neither submitted to nor blessed at the ballot box. The courts attract public support or criticism at least in part by 
the quality o f their reasons. If unexpressed, the judged are prevented from judging the judges.” See also ibid. at 
para. 15:
Reasons for judgment are the primary mechanism by which judges account to 
the parties and to the public for the decisions they render. The courts frequently 
say that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, but critics 
respond that it is difficult to see how justice can be seen to be done if judges fail 
to articulate the reasons for their actions. Trial courts, where the essential 
findings o f facts and drawing o f  inferences are done, can only be held properly 
to account if the reasons for their adjudication are transparent and accessible to 
the public and to the appellate courts.
For a discussion of this case, see Michael C. Plaxton, “Thinking About Appeals, Authority and Judicial Power After 
R. v. Sheppard’ (2003) 47 C.L.Q. 59.
42 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 243 N.R. 
22. For a situation where the legislative branch must provide reasons for judgment, see Campbell, supra note 2 at 
paras. 180-1.
significance for the individual.”43 The majority opinion, penned by L’Heureux-Dubé J., noted 
that the provision of reasons ensures that the decision-maker “carefully” considers all the 
relevant issues; and that the public knows that the decision-maker has done so.44 In the absence 
of positive evidence that the legal decision-maker has weighed all the relevant moral 
considerations, the public will not blindly accept that she has done so.45 One can see the section 
1 test itself as a means of guaranteeing public accountability for Crown incursions on Charter 
rights.46
One suspects that ordinary Canadians would find it impossible to accept positivist claims 
about the nature of legal authority -  and, accordingly, the nature of legal obligations47 The 
positivist scholar may not care about that. After all, one does not settle questions of philosophy 
by referendum (though, as Hart himself observed, one struggles to imagine a coherent theory of 
legal obligations that does not make some reference to the ‘internal point of view’).48 Politicians, 
civil servants, judges -  or anyone who has a professional stake in law -  should care, however, if 
they act in a manner that citizens think does not reflect the true nature of their relationship with 
legal institutions. This is especially true if, by acting in a manner that implicitly grounds legal 
authority in force or social convention, they unwittingly manage to convince people that legal 
obligations are not quite so obligatory.
*
There remains something novel about the notion that lawyers need to think about ‘high theory’ 
when they consider questions of constitutionality. The profession continues to regard itself as
43 Baker, ibid. at para. 43.
44 Ibid. at para. 39.
45 For a discussion of Baker, see David Dyzenhaus and Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance 
Distinction: Baker v. Canada1' (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193.
46 See Sauvé, supra note 1 at para. 23 : “At the end o f the day, people should not be left guessing about why their 
Charter rights have been infringed.”
47 See David Dyzenhaus, “Positivism’s Stagnant Research Programme”, Book Review o f  In Defense of Legal 
Positivism: Law Without Trimmings by Matthew Kramer (2000) 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 703.
48 Hart, supra note 29.
one predominantly unconcerned with philosophy; as a body wrapped up in more ‘practical’ 
affairs. That division no longer appears stable (if it ever did). Canadian constitutional law, today, 
cannot be divorced from issues of political theory. Lawyers who avoid thinking about meta­
constitutional issues risk making an argument that the Court will refuse to recognize; or, if the 
text of the Constitution falls silent in a given case, no argument at all. It may be time to start 
thinking about what makes law worth having and worth practicing.
Perhaps it is unsurprising that, in this ‘new’ Canadian constitutional landscape, 
positivism should find itself a drifter, a theory cut off from its surroundings like a man in an 
existential nightmare. After all, a hard positivist will think the whole idea of an unwritten 
constitution nonsense. To the positivist there is no landscape -  just a hub; a few scattered 
satellites; and lonely roads, each abutting deep space, all leading her to or from the center. She 
spends her life tracing her own footsteps, pacing back and forth, muttering to herself (for no one 
else will listen) about ‘pedigree’, while others walk freely and do their best to delicately ignore 
her. No matter what others say, the positivist refuses to entertain the notion that there is anything 
to the world but the ground beneath her next step, for fear that by looking up she will lose her 
balance and fall o ff49
49 I bear in mind (as a counter-point) the classic Greek parable o f Thales the philosopher who, while pondering the 
sky, fell into a well.
